FS: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, again. Thank you for our patience this morning. We had a—just a little technical difficulty. I would like to welcome all of you to DEA’s Museum Lecture Series. Today this lecture is going to be on Pablo Escobar. This is actually a part of the Drugpins Across the Decades Series that we’re doing.

Over the past several years the DEA Museum has presented over 20 lectures covering many DEA cases and law enforcement initiatives. With us today we’re very lucky to have SACK (ph.) Javier Pena and A-SACK (ph.) Steven Murphy. Special Agent Javier Pena is presently in charge of the DEA San Francisco Field Division.

Special Agent Pena began his career in 1977 with the Webb County Sheriff’s Office, joining the DEA in 1984. In 1988 Special Agent Pena volunteered for assignment in the DEA office in Bogota, Colombia, and became the co-case agent in the investigation of the Medine (ph.) Cartel leader, Pablo Escobar.
In 1994 Special Agent Pena was promoted to Group Supervisor and transferred to San Juan, Puerto Rico. In 1999 he returned to Colombia as the Assistant County—excuse me, Country Attaché. In 2001 he ended his second tour of duty in Colombia and was promoted to Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the San Antonio District Office.

He currently serves as a Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco Field Division. Special Agent Steven Murphy began his law enforcement career in 1975 as a police officer in Bluefield, West Virginia. He joined the DEA in 1987 and was assigned to the Miami Field Division.

In 1991 Special Agent Murphy was promoted and assigned to the DEA Office in Bogota, Colombia. While there he was assigned as one of two primary case agents targeting Pablo Escobar and the Medine Cartel. He was later promoted to Group Supervisor and transferred to the DEA Atlanta Office.

In August 2003 he was promoted to Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Mexico Central America Section.
In June of 2006 Special Agent Murphy was transferred to the DEA Atlanta Office where he is currently assigned. Special Agent Murphy is responsible for the oversight and management of the David G. Wilheim (ph.) Osadef (ph.) Strike Force as well as the DEA Atlanta Special Operations Group, Technical Operations Group and the FBI Joint Terrorism Taskforce.

Welcome to both of you. [APPLAUSE] Additionally, I would like to welcome several retired agents who have come back and joined us today. We, at this point, would kindly ask all of you to please turn your cell phones or Blackberries to vibrate so that we don’t have any interference. Thank you again.

JAVIER PENA

JP: Good morning, everybody. My name’s Javier Pena. Steve Murphy and I wanna thank the DEA Museum for inviting us to do this presentation. I see Mr. Walden. Thank you. I see Mr. Don Semeski (ph.) in the audience. We’re gonna keep this... It’s... We call it a...
It’s a lesson in history of how a person can rise up through the ranks and be the world’s leading exporter of cocaine, how a person can even challenge a country and actually win. And I’ll talk about that here to—after—you know, in the middle of the presentation. But it’s a study on Pablo Escobar and his Medine Cartel as mentioned (ph.).

Escobar was responsible for most of the cocaine, the late ‘80s/early ‘90s, that was reaching the United States. He developed his empire that was built on… It was built on violence, it was built on intimidation, it was built on a lot of money, money to those (ph.) people.

Forbes Magazine at this time had him, I think, as the seventh richest man in the world. Anyway, before we start talking about his organization and how he got dismantled (ph.), I wanna play about a three or four minute film clip from different media sources.
00:04:38:09 MS: He had the power and wealth of a king.

00:04:40:24 MS: He’s a (inaud.) times over. He killed anyone who stood in his way of becoming the world’s most powerful drug lord. He terrorized the nation of Colombia and made an enemy of the most powerful nation on earth. He was the (inaud.) jewel. He is what we wanted. Pablo Escobar and his cocaine cartel became (inaud.) of his own government.

00:05:02:04 MS: (Inaud.). The baddest (ph.) of bandits.

00:05:06:08 MS: He had the wealth, the brain. Pablo Escobar became so big that Pablo needed to die.

00:05:16:15 MS: In 1975 Escobar offers to sell 14 kilos of cocaine to Medine drug boss Fabio Estrepo (ph.). Three weeks later Estrepo was found dead.

00:05:32:11 MS: (Inaud.) ceremoniously that they now work for Pablo Escobar. Pablo introduced a level of violence into the business that they were not used to, so they were really in over their heads.
00:05:45:02  MS: Escobar expands his business by putting police and judges in his pocket. Fueled by America’s appetite for the white powder...

00:05:56:12  MS: Escobar was very invincible. In other words, nobody thought, you know, they could ever take him down. So people were afraid to talk. They were afraid to go up against him cause they know they would end up dead.

00:06:08:09  MS: Pablo was untouchable. A 500 kilogram bomb was placed in a bus which was driven in front of the headquarters building of the DAS (ph.) which was occupied by (Unint.) and it was detonated.

00:06:29:01  MS: November 27, 1989, in an attempt to assassinate Colombian presidential candidate Caesar Guevara (ph.), cocaine boss Pablo Escobar tricks one of his own lieutenants into carrying what he believes is a listening device aboard the candidate’s plane from Bogota to (Inaud.).
Albianca (ph.) Flight 1803 goes down in the mountains outside Bogota. One hundred and ten people are killed. There are no survivors.

MS: Guevara, as it happens, was not on the plane but at the point where Pablo bombed an airplane, he became what the United States considers a clear and present danger. (Inaud.) became the centerpiece of the 1989 Presidential campaign.

MS: Louie Galan (ph.) was the leading candidate for president and Galan was campaigning promising to utilize extradition to rid Colombia of drug traffickers like Pablo Escobar.

MS: Escobar and... He, again, decided that the—Galan was an obstacle, that he shouldn’t be President of Colombia.

MS: August 18, 1989, Galan prepares to deliver a campaign speech in Sachoa (ph.), southwest of Bogota.

MS: Pablo Escobar targeted him and had him killed.
Javier Pena

00:08:05:29 JP: Keep that last picture in mind and I’m gonna explain it. And that’s what actually, that killing of the presidential candidate, led to actually Escobar’s demise. As mentioned, Escobar was one of the richest men. Like I said, built his organization based on fear.

00:08:23:06 We... Late ’80s/early ’90s I get to Colombia (I think it was about 1988) and we’re finding out that there’s—you know, we’re being swamped with cocaine. And some of the old guys who used to work the Miami, the L.A., the New York areas... Remember the price of cocaine at this time was...

00:08:41:13 You know, I think Miami was 30, 35; New York was 40 to 45. We were being flooded. We were doing... There was a lot of the... Remember the cocaine cowboys, the Dayton (ph.) (unint.) killings in Miami where traffickers were ruthlessly killing each other trying to get over—trying to take over, the turf wars.
Like I said, the L.A., the New York markets... And we’re finding out that there was, you know, one person responsible for all of this cocaine. So we started asking who is—who is this guy Pablo Escobar Guevara. We were just trying to get—develop information on him but his name was always coming up as being the boss, controlled the markets in Miami, L.A., New York.

And we were just... Like I said, the violence, the killings... You all remember the Miami's, you know, that would sell the Blanco (ph.), the Black Widow who would kill people to take over their turfs. And all of this cocaine was being controlled by Pablo Escobar. During this time in Colombia one very important word—extradition.

Colombia wa... It was illegal to extradite anybody during this time. So the U.S. started putting a lot of pressure on Colombia as far as the certification process. Certification process is basically if you’re not cooperating, you’re not fighting the drug war, the U.S. is gonna cut off some of the aid.
So we were using—we were using that on Colombia saying, “Guys, you know, we’ve gotta bring back extradition. We gotta go back... You know, we gotta go after this guy Pablo Escobar”. And I said, as mentioned, Escobar was just—at this time was—was... His organization was based on the violence, on intimidation.

He had a lot of money. He was also a very charismatic person. He was considered the Robin Hood of Colombia. He built a lot of homes for the poor, gave the poor a lot of money. The church, I even hate to admit it, the Catholic Church had a PR campaign saying he was just misguided, that he was a good person.

There’d be a priest—a priest by the name of Garcia Arrarros (ph.) who’d come on everyday, one minute, Minuto (ph.) (Unint.) they used to call it and just—just... You know, the priest was just, I hate to say it, just in love with Pablo Escobar. Defended him at no cost.

So we started—we formed an informal taskforce in Colombia at that time. My first partner was Gary
Sharedon (ph.) who has just retired. So we got a—you know, a bunch of... You know, informally we hand-picked some police officers from the Duheen (ph.) area which was like from the Intel section of Bogota.

00:11:27:01 And we—you know, they were based in Medine. And Gary and I used to just visit Medine. We would not stay there. We’d go there maybe on a weekly basis. And I always remember when they would pick us up at the airport. It’d be about three or four cars and I remember all the cops used to, you know, have their guns and their—you know, just put their guns on their thighs.

00:11:47:23 And I’m like saying, “Hey”... You know, I was (unint.) “You all got guns”? Says, “Yeah. You know, get em out” cause (inaud.) wasn’t used to this. So we’d drive around with three or four cars and everybody was armed to the T. So we started as a—as mentioned, investigating Escobar.

00:12:04:11 And I put this picture up here. This is the first time he gets arrested. And I like to put it up there cause it shows that brazen, cocky attitude that
Escobar had. When I said that he formed his own cartel, Pablo was the CEO of the Medine Cartel. And when I say the CEO, all these people...

And I’ll explain the organization here in a little bit. But what they did was that they—everybody borrowed each other’s air strips, each other’s accountants, each other’s labs, each other’s coat (ph.). So it was more of a conglomerate with Escobar up here being the head of it.

Now I put his cousin, Gustavo Guevara, on this side. Gustavo Guevara never got the recognition that he deserved and I say that because Gustavo was actually the brains. Was actually the brains behind the Medine Cartel. Gustavo was the guy who had the routes that would go to Mexico.

I see some Intel people here. Remember back then the Finey (ph.) Route which was a big—it was a big cocaine route they had to Mexico? Gustavo had the contacts with General Noriega. Remember him in Panama? With Montacenos (ph.) in Peru, with Sadress (ph.) in Haiti. These people would infiltrate all the political, the
higher up political organizations of different countries so they could let their dope routes come in through their country.

So Gustavo, like I said, we were—we had a lot of Title 3 intercepts at him. And, you know, basic—at—at—at this time, and I tell people, you know, it was—it was great intercepts. Why? They were pretty much all illegal. And I say it because, you know, you’d pay the phone guy, he’d go up on the phone and that was—that was your intercept.

So we would get a lot of great information from this. Gustavo ended up getting killed by the policy in a shoot out in ’91. We had him surrounded. Gustavo knew the cops were out there and he, like all traffickers, came out shooting, shot it out. Obviously, he lost; the police won.

The other person, also part of the Medina Cartel, this guy up here, Gonzalo Rodriguez Gatcha (ph.) el Mexicano (ph.), believe it or not, he was worst [sic] than Escobar. He was more ruthless than Escobar. He would kill people at a whim. Gustavo. Gatcha el
Mexicano, what they called him, was really responsible for the creation of the AUC, what we see right now with the (unint.) through the fences, the para-military people.

00:14:48:14 What Gatcha did, he hired a person who actually was really the founder of the AUC. I don’t know if Greg (Inaud.) here... Greg and I and Gary debriefed, it was a guy by the name of Henry Paris. Young guy, very charismatic. He was... Gatcha hired him. Gatcha loved Henry so he hired Henry to start a group informally of bodyguards to start protecting their labs against the FARC (ph.), what we see right now, to start protecting the rich landowners if the FARC would come in and get money from em.

00:15:26:17 So Henry was very, very liked by Gatcha. They were partners. And what Gatcha did to turn the tide around, he brought in the Israeli—remember all this, the Israeli mercenaries to teach the alto (ph.) defenses how to—how to place bombs, how to bodyguard people. So it was really a joint...
That’s why it was very hard to infiltrate those people. But Henry actually started the creation of the alto defense of the AUC which then, later on, Carlos Costano (ph.) took over, which I believe now that he is dead. Henry was then killed... After Gatcha’s death...

Gatcha gets killed in 1990. Henry and Escobar do not see eye to eye so they start fighting each other. And that’s where Henry says—you know, calls us up. We debrief him. You know, he gives us a lot of great information and Escobar started fighting Henry. Escobar had Henry killed and that’s how the alto defenses and Solotero (ph.) came over, took over them and eventually developed—evolved into the Carlos Costano era.

The other people part of the Medine Cartel were the Ochoa brothers, Jorge, Luis, Fabio, Quandaveed (ph.), which was a lesser... They were involved in narcotics trafficking, however, they always listened to Pablo. Pablo always controlled the Ochoa brothers. Down here is Fabio Ochoa.
We’re putting him on a plane. I think it was like in ’92 he got extradited and I think he’s serving right now about 30 years in prison. He was tried in Miami, found guilty. He’s serving about 30 years in prison. The other guy who I did not put up here but who was a lesser extent was a guy by the name...

You all—you all remember Carlos Lader (ph.). He’s in prison now in the United States. They really didn’t like Lader because Lader was a little crazy. He was more into the hippy movement, the smoking of dope. So they really didn’t associate with him. However, Carlos later had—was part of this cartel.

This is Roberto Escobar, Pablo’s brother, who was blind now and in jail. And he got blinded by a letter bomb that was sent by Los Papas (ph.), and I’ll talk about Los Papas later on. These guys down here is [sic] kind of interesting. They’re called “sicarios” (ph.), and in translation, two assassins.

During this time in Colombia, as you all know, Escobar used to drive around with hundreds of bodyguards, had the fancy jewelry, the fancy cars, the fancy parties.
They’d go into nightclubs in Medine and Bogota and if you were there, they would close the doors, they would not let anybody leave.

He would pick up the tab at the end of the time. You know, they’d pick up your cell phones. You could not make a call. He’d also give you a little profit, a little money after the clubs would close. So those guys were all, like I said, sicarios. They grew up in the— in the poorest neighborhoods and they idolized Escobar.

Like I said, Escobar to them was a Robin Hood. They... Everybody wanted to be like him, everybody wanted to work for him. That was a problem we encountered. And those people didn’t care about dying. Those people are pretty much all dead. There’s... This guy’s still alive but, like I said, those were his worst sicarios.

What I wanna point out, that his worst and best sicario is a guy down here, Lakeeka (ph.). Then Denny (ph.) (Unint.) Moscara (ph.). Interesting story. We’re in Medine and I remember one of the analysts says, “Javier, I think Lakeeka is in Los Angeles”.
And I’ll always remember one of his supervisors says, “Nay, can’t be. Lakeeka’s not in the United States. He’s... You know, he’s here in Colombia”. And I’ll always remember (Inaud.) was saying, “You know, Javier, here’s a number and it’s an L.A. number. I know it’s”...

(Unint.). “Okay.” So we give the number—we pass it to L.A. and I think Steve told me it was to Steve (Unint.). And I hadn’t realized that (Unint.) was an associate SACK now in Atlanta. So we passed him the number and it’s a hotel number. The guy’s DEA goes to the hotel and all of a sudden the clerk at the hotel says, “Yeah”.

We take a picture. He said, “Yeah, that’s the guy who was here and the guy just took off”. So he says, “Whoa oh, we got a problem here”. What’s one of Escobar’s most trusted, favorite sicarios, the deadliest guy he has in the United States [sic]”? So we put a full court press on and this is even before the telephone technology.
We started more of a trap and trace in a foreign country which was very unusual. We had to go to the highest levels of justice to the highest levels of the phone company cause we were targeting the phone seeing where he was in the United States. The next call comes in and we miss him again.

He’s in Boston and we miss him by minutes. And then we get a break. Lakeeka, Dendenny (ph.) Minyose (ph.), they call him Lakeeka, calls his mother’s house in Medine. The momma’s not in. So he tells the sister, “Hey, tell Mom to call me at this number in New York like tomorrow morning night at 8:00”.

Wow, we got the number, we passed it to New York and it was a payphone. So you can imagine we had like 200 agents staked out at that payphone (unint.) with false mustaches and beards. And the phone call came in right at 8:00 and this guy comes in, answers it, we arrest him and the guy gives us a false name, something like, “Hey, my name’s not Lakeeka”.

“I’m John Doe.” Whatever. I remember it was a false name. What that did was we had a really great judge
in New York by the name of Sterling Johnson. Some of you all know him. He’s been a great friend to DEA, law enforcement. And we were able to convict him on the charge of 1001, which is what, lying to a federal agent.

I told people in San Francisco and they all laugh at me. “Yeah, we’re gonna convict ya. We’re gonna charge you with lying to a federal agent.” Right! So we were able to convict him and I remember the judge sentenced him to a life impris—I mean, five years, which is the maximum.

And I mentioned this because what happened with the five years, we were able to prove that Lakeeka was responsible for the logistics of blowing up the Albianca airline plane that left from Bogota (unint.). When you all saw the pictures, hundreds of people were killed.

A couple of theories were that there were some DEA informants on the plane. I sort of believe that. The other one was that there were some DEA agents who were flying to Bolatah (ph.) to Kali. And you know what?
There were gonna be some agents flying. We took em off the plan.

00:22:19:29 We did not know about the bomb, and Lakeeka was the one who orchestrated that. And Lakeeka told his buddy, “Hey, all you’re gonna do is here’s a briefcase. Once the plane gets up in the air, flip the switch. And all it is, you’re gonna be intercepting the guy next to you”.

00:22:35:10 “We just wanna record you,” and says, “just to hear what he’s gonna do”. So as soon as he flipped on the switch, what happens? It was a bomb and about 100 people get killed. What gave us venue, there were like two U.S. citizens on that plane and which is, like I said, Lakeeka was the one who perpetrated that and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

00:23:01:08 Anyway, and like I said, (unint.) was serving a life sentence in the— in the U.S. right now, the other member of the cartel. One thing I forgot to mention when we were talking about Gustavo Guevara and the hooks, all the contacts he had with Panama, Mexico, the labs at this time...
Everybody was borrowing (ph.) the labs from each other. These people were sending five to seven Commander 1000 airplanes, each with about five to seven hundred keys (ph.) of cocaine on a daily basis to Mexico. So at this time the price is about 35 to 40.

The airplanes... And they were lined up like at airports in the clandestine (ph.) jungles sending them into Mexico. The price to—for a kilo of cocaine was about $1,000.00. To transport it to the United States was about $3,000.00. So that’s about a $4,000.00 investment.

And the price you were given (ph.) was between 35, sometimes all the way up to 50,000. So if you’re doing about five airplanes, five or seven airplanes, 500 kilos each, I mean, Mr. Semeski, that’s a lot of money. That’s all I know. And the money was being brought back in millions and millions of dollars.

That’s why these people didn’t care if they lost 500 kilos, if they lost 1,000. Their stockpile of cocaine...
was, you know... They had about, you know, 10, 20 tons already to go. So the—you know, the cocaine did not matter. Going back when I said the presidential candidate...

00:24:36:00 At this time the President was a person—elderly person. Great President, Verjillio (ph.) Barco (ph.) Vargas (ph.). Extradition was not legal. Extradition was illegal. The U.S. were putting a lot of pressure that we wanted to bring back extradition. And so what happens, because of the pressure, Escobar starts not—you know, starts fighting a little, not that much.

00:25:02:19 But people in Colombia were getting tired of the traffickers. They would not get arrested or if they would get arrested, they’d spend a couple of hours and they’d be out the window. Then all of a sudden we had a newspaper editor by the name of Guijermo (ph.) (Unint.).

00:25:18:11 So he wrote an op, a bad piece on saying maybe we should bring extradition. So what happens? Escobar blows up the newspaper, kills the editor. So people are starting to say, “You know, something’s wrong
here”. Barco Vargas was towards the end of his career and his predecessor was this person, Louis Carlos Galan.

00:25:41:01 I call him the John F. Kennedy of Colombia. Loved by everybody. Great person and he was—his platform was he was running and said if he got elected, he was going to bring back extradition. So that upset Mr. Escobar so on—right outside Bogota, the film clip, I think it’s ’91, Galan is campaigning, he’s up on stage, what happens?

00:26:07:12 Escobar has him killed, assassinated in front of hundreds of people. Cold blood. You all saw the film clip. I mean, that’s just—that’s the actual flim [sic] clip of the assassination. Now I always remember it was on a Friday night and, you know, everybody remembers certain events.

00:26:22:22 I remember we’re at a bar Friday night. Where else are you gonna be, right? Not really, but we were. And I remember the waitress star—comes in crying and running, “You know what? Colombia has just declared marshal law. Everybody needs to get out of here”.

24
That same night the President of Colombia, Barco Vargas, calls DEA and says, “You know what, DEA”—and calls the U.S. Embassy.

00:26:49:17 He says, “I am—I have just authorized extradition on my own decree”. And we’re like, “What did you do”? He said, “I... You know, on my own decree I am bypassing congress,” cause it was a constitutional amendment). And he said, “Under my administrative authority, I’ve just brought back extradition”.

00:27:10:05 “I wanna start extraditing everybody as soon as we can.” DEA, I gotta admit, stepped up to the plate. In fact, they hit a homerun. Our Intel people (Unint.), Judy Bertini (ph.), Bobby Nevez (ph.), Greg Passick (ph.), all these guys send us downs tons of analysts.

00:27:30:25 We started creating arrest search packages. I mean, how better can you have it if, you know, the government of Colombia says, “Give me everything you have. We’re gonna start, you know, arresting all these people”. And that we did. The marshals would
come in with their big 747s and they’d land right in—at the El Dorado Airport in Bogota.

00:27:50:15 They get... Everybody was dressed, you know, in the black Ninja suits, guns all over the place and we put it—we would have—extradite all those people in front of—of—of—of the world, Colombians, so everybody could see. I remember the first person we extradited was one of the Escobar’s main accountants, Martinez (ph.) Romero (ph.).

00:28:09:12 And it was a case worked out of Atlanta by Skip Lassitt (ph.) and Caesar Dias (ph.). I remember em. We extradited about 30; however, like I said, Intel did a great job. We had packages. It was... We were rocking and rolling, putting people in airplanes, bringing em back.

00:28:25:12 And these were some of the toughest traffickers in Colombia. So what—the other part of the equation, what happened is that this infuriated Pablo Escobar Guevara. He said, “You know what, government of Colombia? You have—you have started extraditing all of my traffickers so I am declaring war on you”.  

26
And war he declared. I tell people that the term narco-terrorism was coined by Pablo Escobar. When I said war was declared, he started his car bombing campaign and, ladies and gentlemen, it was... I mean, I would see it. It’d be on weekends in front of the shopping malls, in front of stores where kids would be buying books.

He placed the car bombs, place em at the—you know, in the mornings. We were getting, you know, children, women killed, like I said, just right outside the mall at 4:00. He did one right outside where kids were buying their—their—books to go back to school.

He was murdering, like I said, a lot of our police officers. Steve and I will be able to—went to a lot of funerals. We lost a lot of good police officers at this time. He was big into the kidnappings. I guess one of the most famous kidnappings was the daughter of the ex-President Turbuy (ph.)—Gannet (ph.) Turbuy, who ended up getting killed by the traffickers due to the rescue attempt.
It was... Like I said, it—it—it—it was a war. It was a war. He had bounties on police officers. What I mean by a bounty on a police officer is that the sicarios that you saw earlier, you know, if—for every uniformed police officer that they killed, the sicario would make $100.00.

How do we know this? I remember we caught one of em and he admitted to about 10 killings. He said, “Yeah, hey, I... You know, whoever a uniformed police officer I can kill”... I just—I remember he said, “I put my gun on the back of his head, shoot him. At the end of the day” he says, “I go to this house and if I kill five, I make $500.00”.

He said, “With that money”, he said... I mean, I remember this kid was like 16 years old. He says, “You know what? We don’t expect to live beyond 22 here so if I make it by 22 without dying, I’ve made it. I get my money. I give most of it to my mother”.

“As long as I have a little money, you know, to buy to some beer, nice—some blue jeans, a nice pair of tennis
shoes, I’m happy.” And that was the attitude that Escobar developed with all the traffickers. They wanted to work with him, so people did not care if they died for him cause they—you know, life wasn’t that—they wouldn’t expect to live that long.

It got so bad that they declared riding two on motorcycles in Medine was illegal. If you—if you saw two guys, the guy in the back was gonna be the shooter so, I mean, I put that up there just to… There’s a… I don’t know if you can read the last paragraph but it’s basically saying that they had uncovered a couple of bombs that were going to be placed at President Barco’s…

His grandkids were going to school at this certain school and they, you know, uncovered a couple of bombs in there. But it’s just to show the violence. This was Escobar’s – this is classic – his calling card. [SPANISH], which basically saying we prefer a tomb in the United States, we prefer a tomb in Colombia than a jail cell in the United States.
After a lot of the car bombs after a lot of the killings, Escobar would have these pamphlets dropped off at the site. And it was to show that I am responsible. I’ve killed all these innocent people cause, Colombia, I am at war with you. He was taking credit, no doubt about it.

He took credit for all the—all the bombs and all the atrocities, like I said. And this is where we turned—the term of narco-terrorism develops. We developed faceless judges. In other words, that way the judges would not get tampered with. However, that didn’t work.

You remember the phrase that you—that we hear now in Mexico? [SPANISH] Do you want some money or do you want a bullet? So a lot of—a lot of the judicial system, you know, took the money. This was some of the labs that the Escobar people, the Medine Cartel, these were...

So you could really see em. They were like little cities. There were recycling plants, they’d recycle their own precursors. And, like I said... That’s why I
said they would stockpile 10 or 20,000 kilos of cocaine so the price... You know, cocaine seizures was not hurting em.

00:33:11:27 And this is why we were starting to go after the money, try to, you know, seize their ( unint. ), go after it cause, you know, the cocaine was not hurting them. As I mentioned, this is a caletta ( ph. ). It’s a storied ( ph. ) site for cocaine. Out of this hole came this - 10 tons of cocaine that was buried in there.

00:33:34:07 So to them cocaine was not a problem. So going after Escobar and, like I said, the violence that he began on killing police officers, judicial people, the car bombs, thousands of people getting killed, really, the two most atrocities that are linked to Escobar were the DAS bombing and the Albianca bombing.

00:33:57:22 The DAS bombing, as you saw, was like the FBI equivalent in Colombia. He hated a general by the name of General Massa ( ph. ). Hated him cause he thought Massa was the one who orchestrated the search for Escobar. And it was actually another general by
the name of General Otavio (ph.) Vargaciva (ph.) who was credit—who actually said, “DEA, I need your help”.

00:34:19:27 “We are going after Escobar.” And I tell people at this time it was just an informal taskforce that was set up in trying to capture him. These were some of the dope (ph.), some of the markings that he had. This was just some of the smuggling... I put those just, you know, inside the coke, oranges.

00:34:40:24 This was a homemade submarine. It was a science project that they were building to ship their cocaine. We had... It was Russian engineers who were building this. This was some of the money that Escobar had. You see all the gold. I mean, to them... The emerald... It wasn’t...

00:34:56:25 You know, with all the—you know, these were his retreat houses. He’d have em built, lake homes. These are multi-million dollar houses he never got to use. I mean, the money was so abundant, was so, like I said, billions of dollars, he didn’t know what to do with it.
00:35:11:02 So he would build whatever he could in whatever types of land. That was his... He had a—his ranch, Frinkanopolis (ph.), he had a (unint.) built on it. (Unint.) up here. He had a bull fighting ring. He had all sorts of exotic animals on his frinka (ph.). This is...

00:35:32:11 And I can’t tell but I know Bob (Unint.), Doug Wonko (ph.)... Bob (Unint.) was in charge of our foreign operations at this time. Doug Wonko was in charge of our—was Chief of Operations. He was a great help. Whatever we needed, they helped us. Like I said, we had a TKO program which was, I think, 559 and it was...

00:35:52:04 You know, all the U.S. offices were supposed to go after Escobar, and they did. We were disrupting his organization left and right, arresting people in the United States, at the same time arresting people in Colombia. It was a great—it was—it was working, like I said.

00:36:11:02 DEA, everybody came in together and whoever worked either directly or indirectly for Escobar, our TKO program was targeted at arresting all of his people.
So we had a lot of support from our headquarters. When I said that the DAS and the Albianca building was—really, you know, broke the camel’s back, what happened at this point was that Escobar called up the government of Colombia and said, “You know what, government of Colombia”?

00:36:42:11 “I’ll stop all my killings, I’ll stop all my assassinations, my kidnappings under two conditions.”

And they said, “All right. What are they”? “That you stop extraditing people and that I build my own prison and that I—and I can still surrender at my own prison with the condition I take my prison guards with me.”

00:37:04:12 “I’ll hire them. I’ll take my assassins. That way they protect me. You cannot fly over, you cannot have an inspection.” And sadly, and I say sadly because to us the government of Columbia agreed. They agreed to let him surrender. And, you know, I mean, I told people if I’m the President, I’m getting a lot—all my innocent people killed left and right on a daily basis, the car bombs, women and children, you know, it was their decision.
00:37:36:03 Right/wrong decision? I don’t know. It was sad on our part cause of all the friends we had lost. We were devastated. Then the next day we see Escobar getting on a helicopter with all his assassins and they’re off to their own prison system. So it—it—it was...

00:37:52:14 Like I said, it was sad on our part but... And I just don’t know... Like I said, it was—that was the government of Colombia’s decision and, you know, because... While the... Like I said, all the friends that he had killed, it was devastated towards us [sic].

00:38:10:02 So Escobar was off in his own prison system and the rest I’m gonna have Mr. Steve Murphy, my partner, talk about the last—the last search for Mr. Escobar. Steve.

STEVE MURPHY

00:38:35:15 SM: Good morning. Before I start I just wanted to say I’ve had a very fortunate career of 21 years with the DEA. And I get to work with people like that. That guy’s like an encyclopedia. You know? I’ve
ridden his coattails for years and here I am still up here doing it.

00:38:50:00 So it’s been a great pleasure working with you, Javier. I got to Bogota in 1991—June of 1991. Javier had already been there for three years; that’s why he’s talking about the background. I mean, he was there living it and... Hello, Greg Passick. Nice to see you, again.

00:39:07:12 When I got there in June of 1991, I had been in the country three days when Pablo self-surrendered to the government. And as Javier told you, that’s—that was negotiations that were ongoing. He had time to build his own prison and so forth. I always like to think that he heard Steve Murphy was in town so he better give up. So...

00:39:24:15 I don’t know if that was true or not. Now let’s see if I can figure this out. And...

00:39:30:04 FS: (Inaud.).

00:39:31:05 SM: I’m sorry?
00:39:31:28   FS:  (Inaud.).

00:39:34:02   SM:  That he heard that Steve Murphy arrived in Bogota and he needed to surrender.

00:39:37:11   FS:  Oh.

00:39:38:04   MS:  (Inaud.).

00:39:39:22   SM:  It was a lame joke. I don’t get any better than that.

00:39:42:12   MS:  Very lame.

00:39:43:01   SM:  Yeah.

00:39:43:25   MS:  Very.

00:39:44:02   SM:  That’s about as good as it gets. At the end of this presentation we’ve got a few more photographs of the prison but this is some photographs of Pablo’s self-built prison. I’ve been to quite a few prisons
in the United States. I’ve never seen any with color-coordinated upholstery and drapery, two-room suites.

What else we got here? His closet here at the bottom with his own built-in safe in a hidden area in the back. Bar stools on the end. I mean, that’s a pretty nice prison, right? I could probably live in a prison like that. So... And I don’t mean to make fun of it. It’s kind of comical, although just like Javier said, it was sad for us as Americans because, you know, we tend to think that we would never give in like that.

But then when you’re in a President’s position and you’re having to decide can I save some of my countrymen by giving in to a few of these demands, that’s a hard decision to make. I’d hate to be put in that position and have to make that decision. In his—in his suite there, you can see this is the desk inside of his office and two very good looking gentlemen sitting there.

These were some of the explosives. We’d go out on patrols with these guys—with the Colombian National Police and these were some of the collectives that
we’d find. This one on the bottom left here is full of dynamite that’s buried in the ground. And the picture above it is the...

Colombians were great about laying everything out so you could get these really neat pictures of em. And you could actually see what it all consisted of. The bottom right hand corner here you’ve got a Stinger missile, a taken down aircraft. Javier’s already told you about the Albianca flight and the picture in the top right is the DAS building when they tried to target General Massa and kill him.

Torture. You know, these are some very graphic photos but the torture...

MS: (Inaud.).

SM: Right. And what Javier said is they believed—the Medine Cartel guys believed that this individual was an informant. So they tortured him, they burned him, they cut body parts off and then you can see how they left him. This is Rodriguez Gatcha. He told you... You know, he was even more violent than Pablo Escobar.
He was killed in ’89, I believe you said. Right? The brains behind Pablo’s cousin, Gustavo. Okay, we’re at Escobar’s last stand. And this is... [B ROLL] I got there in ’91 and then about a year later is when Pablo escapes. It was roughly June of 1992. When that happened... [Coughing] That’s when the—Javier got together and I got together with him and Gary Sharedon had transferred up to Baronquia (ph.) from Bogota at the time.

We were already working very closely with the Colombian National Police but what we did is we joined forces once again and we put together what we called the (Unint.), which is—translates into the search block. This was a 600-man force, so Colombian National Police Officers.

We were stationed at a place called the Carlos (Unint.) School in Medine and we were located in some of the worst barrios of Medine. It was similar to... We don’t have police bases like this in the United States so it was very similar to a military base where you had your outer perimeters, your inner perimeters,
you had concrete barriers set up that you had to drive through in a serpentine fashion.

You had a guard posted everywhere. It was almost like being in a prison ourselves. And this video’s gonna do a little more explaining of how we pursued Escobar once he escaped.

[VIDEO]

SM: That’s pretty dramatic stuff, huh? That’s one of the most accurate reenactments I think I’ve seen of this. On that day, and I should have given you a little bit better lead in, when we started the (Unint.) and—for 18 months we searched for Escobar. The first, what, six months, were just right behind the guy.

We were getting great Intel, we were getting intercepts, we were able to triangulate (ph.) on some radio signals using directional finding equipment. And this was more of the—in the primitive days back in the—in the early ‘90s. It’s much more refined now.
But after about six months or so it—just all of a sudden it seemed like the information dried up. So, you know, you’re just—you’re trying to exploit every lead you could. Javier and I are living at the base with the cops up in Medine. We’re living in conditions where it’s...

They won’t Javier and I leave the country at the same time. We can’t take a vacation at the same time. One of us has to be in Medine at all time, the other has to be back in Bogota taking care of business there because whoever’s in Medine’s collecting the information and you need to get that disseminated out to the appropriate offices around the world.

We’re living in a place with no hot water. We’re eating rice and potatoes three times a day. You know, if you’re lucky, you might get a piece of leather that they called steak once a week. You’re out on helicopters flying around, going on mountain patrols, patrolling the valleys.

You’re just trying to follow up on any leads you could. There were other Americans in the base. We...
The Ambassador at the time called in the Delta Force. Those guys are outstanding. Javier and I have talked about it numerous times and again last night, that if we’re—something ever happens to me and I’m kidnapped, I certainly hope that Delta is there cause I would trust my life with those guys.

But they were there in a training capacity. We were out working with the cops, you know, going out on a daily basis with em. We set up an 800 number there at the Carlos (Unint.) School where Colombians could call in and give tips. Because of the corruption factor throughout Colombia they felt at times more comfortable talking to a Gringo.

They just didn’t realize how Gringo I was when they talked to me in Spanish. It was just a variety of things there that we were trying to exploit. Then towards the month—18–18th month, December 1993… I’ve been a cop since 1975. That’s the closest I’ve ever become to burn out personally, just because I’m leaving my family back in Bogota for weeks at a time while Javier’s off running around and he’s trying to do the same thing.
And, as a matter of fact, on that day when Escobar was killed, they had forced... I shouldn’t use the word “forced” but Javier had to go to Miami to debrief a potential informant with information where Escobar could have been in Haiti. And, I mean, this guy has enough experience to know what’s good information, what’s not good information.

And we didn’t wanna do it but you couldn’t pass up on an opportunity to collect an actionable lead. So when he took off to Miami, of course I’m up in Medine and it was just by faith that I happened to be there the day when the major called in and... I was with Colonel Martinez there when the major called in and said, “Vive Colombia. Pablo’s dead”.

Let’s see what other photos we’ve got here. Now... Yeah, go ahead.

MS: (Inaud.).

SM: And the father, son...
JAVIER PENA

00:49:48:04  JP: Let me... Earlier in the presentation, cause it’s out there and I gotta Los Papas. Los Papas was a group, it’s a vigilante group that was made of ex-Escobar associates. What happened is Escobar had two of his favorite trafficking guys that were Galiano (ph.) and (Unint.) families killed because they—Escobar thought they had stolen 10 million dollars from him.

00:50:15:01  So he brought in his two... And they were his favorite distributors, his childhood friends. Had em killed. So this is what we were able to convince the government of Colombia that while Escobar was still in prison, he was still running dope, killing people. And this is what caused the government of Colombia to say, “You know what? We gotta get him out of his fancy”...

00:50:35:20  They call em the Chaleas (ph.), you know, the (Unint.) prison system. And because of Los Papas being formed... And there was a lot of insinuation that they were
working with the police. We never saw it. You know, I mean, you had some, you know, suspicion; however, Los Papas were killing...

00:50:53:09 They were going after Escobar and going after his family. Escobar was trying to get his family to Miami. We... And, in fact, he almost did it. We caught em in Medine. We pulled them off the plane. Then the last one was he was trying to get em to Germany.

00:51:07:28 We had an agent, in fact Kenny McGee, who was here. We put him on a plane, went to Germany and we convinced the German authorities to turn em back. They turned em back. And, Steve, you were there. I mean... But... And the (unint.) it’s really—this is movie material with the father and son.

STEVE MURPHY

00:51:27:24 SM: Yeah. Javier and I were talking about it last night, and what he’s discussing is Colonel Martinez was the current C&P Colonel in charge of the search block. His son that was using the directional finding equipment at the very beginning of that vi—of the
video was a lieutenant with the Colombian National Police.

00:51:44:01 So here you had a father/son team on the good guy side and they were going up against Pablo Escobar. And the way they intercepted Pablo was when he was talking to his son, Juan Pablo. So you had a father/son team on the good guys against a father/son team on the bad guys. That’s...

00:51:59:11 I mean, that’s... What I know about movie material, that certainly seems enticing. And just a couple more minutes, I just wanna show you real quickly this is the prison that Pablo built himself. The plans for it once he had done his few years in prison, which he had agreed to with the government, was to turn it into a resort area.

00:52:17:27 So this is an aerial view from the helicopter flying in. This is your main compound right here. Pablo’s room is right here on the end of this building. These are some of the security devices that were found. And in Colombia when law enforcement—when the upper ranking members of law enforcement are out or the
politicians, they have bodyguards that wear these armbands which are over on the right side there.

And those were the escoltas (ph.), the escorts, the armed escorts. And when you saw those vehicles coming, you didn’t get close to em because if you got too close, they would open fire on you. So when Escobar would leave the prison to go to a soccer match or to go shopping or to go to dinner or to go visit his family or whatever, his bodyguards would wear those armbands.

Satellite phones that they were using, these are kind of primitive from—for back in that time, but they had the latest and greatest that was out there. Some of the monitoring devices that they would use to do their own wiretaps, to record their own conversations with whoever they were talking to.

If they were—could get lucky enough to get a politician on the phone, certainly that’s something you wanna record and you can exploit down the road. Now there was a—there was a time when he was in the
prison and we couldn’t figure out why we couldn’t intercept communications coming out of the prison.

Once we got an opportunity to go into the prison, what we found were these large pigeon coops throughout the prison. And basically what they were using is homing pigeons. On one leg of these pigeons would be the name of the person that that pigeon would fly to and on the other leg they would band the message that they wanted to get out to that person.

So, I mean, they’re using everything from satellite phones back to homing pigeons. You know, it’s no wonder we couldn’t figure out what it was. We’d have probably thought they were dove and shot em. There were a lot of... Pardon?

MS: Parties.

SM: Yeah. A lot of parties that went on inside the prison where they would bring reigning beauty queens in, Colombian beauty queens or from other South American countries. I’ve got a picture in here I’ll show you in just a second of a bar area. And this is
how they would smuggle people in and out of the prison.

00:54:18:19 One thing that I always found ironic about this prison and I don’t believe Javier mentioned it, but when he created his conditions that he would surrender under, one of the conditions that—was that the Columbian National Police could not come within about 200 yards of the prison.

00:54:32:04 Now these are the police officers and they weren’t allowed to go the prison. So, you know, are these fences on the prison used to keep Escobar in or keep the cops out? You know what we think. Now this is the front door to Escobar’s so-called cell. What these are here is this is the power and alarm systems that control the whole prison.

00:54:50:23 So if he wants the alarms cut off so he can go out and do something, he just steps out his door and hits the switches and they go down. I don’t think we have that in the United States. Again, here’s a photograph of the main room that you come into. You know, it’s got the color-coordinated upholstery and couches again,
the fireplace in the corner, the televisions, the banana bar.

00:55:12:04 If you’re looking in from the front door, this is what you see. Complete with his own microwave oven and full-size refrigerator over here. Kind of ironic is you see this poster right there. Javier has already showed you that once. That’s the wanted poster. Now how’s that for a slap in the face to the government of Colombia.

00:55:31:21 He’s got his own wanted poster hanging on the wall with him and all his buddies. This is his bedroom area. It’s a little bit bigger than—bigger than a king size bed. I don’t know what size you call that but it’s huge. He’s got his audio video center over here.

00:55:47:09 The front part of this area is his office. Unique about all these files he has up here, these contain letters from people around the world, or one group of em does. The other group contains any periodical, any media piece that he could find throughout the world that mentioned him.
He had it cut out and he kept it on his—this—or his little archives. But some of the letters that came in from around the world were from females who would offer to marry Pablo and have his love child, you know. So some strange people out there. This is looking from the bed over towards the office area.

Of course, he did not have what DEA had (we brought it with us) but it kind of made a neat picture. Behind his desk here’s some of the infamous photographs that you heard about over the years where Pablo and Juan Pablo, when Juan was a very young man. They’re standing in front of the White House.

These are some of the mug shots that were taken in Colombia throughout his criminal career. This one down here is a—an article out of Hustler Magazine. I won’t talk about that. And then obviously one of his heroes was Chagavarro (ph.), the Marxist.

Here’s his—here’s his closet area again and, you know, again, keep in mind we’re talking about a prison cell here. We’re not talking about a—somebody’s condo.
This is supposed to be where he’s being penalized for all his drug crimes. I kind of find it neat that you could pull out the shelves on here and here’s a safe.

And then, again, you move the clothes off this rack right here and there’s a recess button. You push that and there’s a hidden area back there that you can go and hide. One of the things these guys feared, just like he showed you on the card that the extra-extraditables put out, was they would prefer a tomb in the United—in Colombia to a cell in the United States.

And that went a long way towards keeping us alive down there too, cause there were times when just being down there and doing what you were doing was like sticking your head in a lion’s mouth. This is the view out of his plate glass window in his bedroom. And down in the valley is the main part of Medine.

That’s the central—all the skyscrapers and everything. What a beautiful view, huh? And you can see here there’s some of the pigeon coops or one of the pigeon roosts. This is the patio area out in front of his
room where he could... I guess if you wanna go out and smoke a cigar, you go out on the patio.

00:57:55:21 This is kind of unique also. Below the patio area is this playhouse that he created for his daughter Manuela, complete with electricity and running water. I’ve got—I’ve got two daughters and they’ve got that Lego/Playskool house, you know, when they were young and it didn’t have running water.

00:58:14:25 And this is just sitting out in front there and we wanted to show you that in one point in our lives we did have more hair and it wasn’t all gray.

00:58:20:23 JP: And were a lot skinnier too.

00:58:22:00 SM: Yeah. Yeah. Better shape. This is... What we wanted to show you on this is this is the top of the septic system for the prison. But see these poles, the multi-colored poles that are there? They were so worried about the United States coming in and grabbing and extraditing them to the United States, they feared that so much that they erected those poles so that a
helicopter could not sit down on top of that concrete septic system and come in and get em.

00:58:46:18 When the police—when Escobar escaped and the cops finally got into the facility, there was an anti-aircraft gun in there. It was taken out almost immediately but I mean, that’s how paranoid he was of the United States coming in to get him. Some of the other prisons’ cells, just so you can see that they weren’t living behind the bars and, you know, the 4X5 cells that you see on TV.

00:59:07:21 Big screen TVs, stereo systems, you know, the latest… Back then there’s reel-to-reel stuff. Here’s the club area, the little nightclub they had. These smoke-glass windows look down on that valley that looks down into the city of Medine. This is where they had a lot of parties.

00:59:23:25 This is a… Of course, you’ve gotta have an exercise room up there because you saw in his death pictures how—what great shape he was in. So… And what’s ironic about this is they had their own soccer field up there. The soccer field looks very barren but
that’s because they would resurface it about once a quarter. You know?

00:59:40:03 So he’s got enough money coming in. He’s charging taxes to the other drug dealers in Colombia that, hey, I’m taking all the heat from the government so you take—you pay me a tax for the dope loads that you get out of the country and that’s how I’ll maintain my lifestyle.

00:59:53:19 Now see these steps that lead up right here? There’s a better shot. They’re leading up to the fence. What’s interesting is when you get to the fence there’s a hole in it. It’s not a gate; it’s just a hole. So how do you keep your prisoners in? Again, are we keeping the prisoners in or are we keeping the good guys out?

01:00:09:06 What that led to is a group of chalets. And if you can see em… Of course, you can see this one pretty easy right here. But in this area right here is another chalet. What they’re trying to do is camouflage it there on the mountainside in all the greenery.
They’re trying to prevent aerial surveillance by the Americans. That’s a pretty nice chalet to have in a prison, right? I guess if you get tired of sleeping in your two-room suite with your Jacuzzi bathtub, you can walk up past the soccer field, out the fence and go up here and have a little privacy.

This is some of the fake greenery they had on top of the chalets to try to disguise em from the air, camouflage em. Nice porch out there. All these flowers are fake. It’s all fake just to, again, try to blend in with the countryside. There’s two additional chalets that they’re in the process of building so you can have a nice variety to chose from.

I think there were a total of 15 prisoners in there, right? So you’ve got Pablo and 14 of his hand-picked cellmates/prison mates. So you need enough chalets to entertain everybody, you know. You don’t wanna have everybody in one ti—in one place at the same time. Now to get up to the chalets you gotta go up this sidewalk.
Right here’s a guard booth, and right here also. So you gotta go through prison guards. And, of course, the prisoners don’t but anybody else that comes here, they’re not gonna get up to the chalets without going through the guards and being cleared first. I mean, this was just really, really a joke.

Up in one of the chalets Escobar... You can see how thick those walls are. He had one chalet built with those thick walls thinking that if the U.S. ever came in and tried to bomb him, to take over, that he would be safe in these thick walled chalets up on the—on the mountainside there.

In one of the chalets if you’re—I guess if you’re being attacked and people are coming to get you, you’ll go in this closet, lift the floor up and there’s an escape route to get you out underneath the place and get you up on the mountainside. And this is ironic also.

This is where the guards lived. (Inaud.) kind of pathetic. You’d think it’d be the other way around but that’s the way it was. When... The day... I told
you the day Escobar was killed Javier was in Miami and there’s nobody that was more deserving to be there on that day than Javier Pena, but he was doing his job.

01:02:21:24 We were just pushing every button we could, following up on every potential lead. The nice thing for me was the next day Javier came and got me out of Medine, so... They brought an airplane up and— and... It wasn’t Medivac but they evac’d me out of Medine as quickly as possible.

01:02:36:18 Things were a little bit tense at the time. You’ve seen that newspaper clipping. The bottom line here is, you know, we spent a lot of time here. We’ve gone over our time limit. I’m sorry for that.

01:02:47:18 JP: (Inaud.).

01:02:49:03 SM: Yeah, the... And that’s what Javier is reminding me. This is absolutely true. There’s been books written on this, there’s been TV shows, there’s been a lot of innuendo, a lot of supposition as to what really happened out there that day. The point that we both agree on that we wanna leave you with, a couple
points actually, is, one, here’s a guy who was rated number—the number seven richest man in the world.

01:03:12:29 Look at his fat butt up there now. That’s what happens. You know, how infamous is he now? He’s just another doper. The second thing is, yes, we were there, we participated, we made sacrifices. DEA was the forefront of this entire investigation. Other agencies participated but DEA was just right there every single day out in the jungles, on the mountaintops, in the streets of Colombia.

01:03:37:09 But when it comes down to it, the agency that deserves the most credit for the culmination of this case is the Colombian National Police. There have been articles that suggest that there was a—some magnificent sniper shot by a Delta Force guy, and I’m not taking anything away from those guys.

01:03:55:10 Those guys are top-notch. I’ve never met anybody like them in my entire life. But I was with them in the base that day when the lieutenant called in and said, “I’m driving down the street. I think I got him”. I
know where those guys were cause I was standing in a
room with them.

01:04:10:10 And I guess that’s the one thing I wanna leave you
with is that the true heroes behind all this are the
Colombian National Police. We assisted, a lot of
people in this room assisted. I see Barbara Joe (ph.)
Hasussy (ph.) back there. She was very instrumental
on the—on the Intel side.

01:04:23:29 Greg and some of those folks that were mentioned here
and... If I—if we’ve forgotten your name or overlooked
you, we sincerely apologize for that. There’s no
slight on you. But we just wanna leave you with the
idea that the Colombia National Police stepped up to
the plate.

01:04:34:17 Corruption is rampant down there. It’s unbelievable.
But we worked with a group of honest police officers
that stepped up to the plate and did their job. For
the young folks in here, it’s nice to see you in here.
I hope we’ve gotten across to you that there is an
opulent lifestyle that goes along with this illegal
activity but right there is the outcome.
So come over with the good guys. Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

JAVIER PENA

JP: And like, Steve, let me acknowledge Greg Passick. Like I said, if it wasn’t for Greg, Greg had the foresight of going after the financial investigations. It was great. We would hit a financial place, we’d have the analyst, we’d copy down all the— all the records, all the accounts.

The U.S. people would freeze as many accounts as possible. We’d take the records back to the U.S. and I said, “Thanks, Greg”. I mean, he always had the foresight of, hey, go after the financial aspect which is I know what Don is doing right now so… And that works as mentioned.

Coke, they got tons of coke. It’s… Coke is not a problem; the money is. So… And, like Steve said, it was a collaborative effort by everybody so—and I wanna thank the DEA Museum for inviting us over today—this morning. Thank you.
01:05:46:00 FS: Our pleasure. [APPLAUSE] I know that we got a late start and, again, I apologize. I do wanna give you the opportunity, if you have time, if there’s any questions you would like to present to either our agents here (we’re gonna limit it to maybe four or five questions), I ask that you actually raise your hand so that they can pass you a mike.

Q&A

01:06:24:03 Q: I just wanna thank you for being here today. This was a very interesting presentation, a lot of interesting details. Some of us have probably studied the—this episode and understand, you know, read the book, Mark Bouden’s (ph.) book. I just wanna go back to the Papas (ph.) just for a minute.

01:06:45:10 As we all know that, you know, this is a very important episode, I think, in Colombia’s history and—and—for a lot of reasons, I mean, partly because of Escobar and who he was but also because partly the Papas, the group that, as you mentioned, may have had some connections or some suspicions of connections to
the taskforce—the police taskforce, went on to really form the nucleus of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia which, of course, rose, as you know, to be one of the strongest players in Colombia’s civil conflict.

So the connections of the taskforce to the Papas aren’t trivial at all. So wasn’t it, in fact, pretty well known by the—say, the Summer of 1993, several months before Escobar was killed, that there were connections between the taskforce and the Papas? I’m not saying the DEA specifically but certainly the Colombian police, Colombian police intelligence.

There’s declassified memos on this from the State Department. I assume it would have been known throughout the kind of embassy team and the intelligence people, so wasn’t that, in fact, pretty well known that the Fiscalea (ph.), the Colombian attorney general had an investigation open and that they were discussing how to handle it and how to handle it so as not to interrupt the anti-Escobar operations?
JP: Basically, like you said, yes, when Los Papas were formed, there was a lot of, like you said, insinuation that some of the police guys were associated with them. You are correct. However, like you said, it was—in the book... And, you know, what—I haven't read Mark Bouden's book.

I've seen some excerpts. But that's all that... I mean, there was insinuation. It was, like you said, hey, this guy may be associated with Los Papas. It was never, like I said, seen fact. It was always innuendos. So I really like can't tell you that, yes, this police officer was associated.

After the search there was a lot of—there was a... You know, in fact, one of the majors, one of the colonels was killed by (Unint.) Gonzales (ph.). Afterwards, there was a lot of... Like I said, it was never proven. That there were insinuations that, you know, this person had contacts with them.

Now during this time the attorney general in Colombia, Gustavo De Graf (ph.), had authorized a lot of—I guess a lot of traffickers to work off their cases in
working with the National Police. Like I said, the insinuation was there and—but like I said, on a factual type basis we...

01:09:41:25 You know, like I said, we never experienced... Steve, you wanna (inaud.).

01:09:46:09 SM: ...covers it all. The only thing I would add to it is that, you know, at the time we were willing... Like the 800 numbers, the tip lines, we were pretty much willing to talk to anybody, especially the people that the Colombian National Police would bring to our attention for information.

01:10:06:29 When Mark was writing his book, you know, he was consulting with us and collecting information, and he asked the same question. And I asked him where did—you know, first of all, where’d you get the information and he said he couldn’t tell me cause he has his classified sources.

01:10:21:10 But the other item was that one of the individuals who at that time we were collecting information from was a suspected leader of Los Papas six years later. Well,
obviously had we known he was a suspected leader of Los Papas, and I believe if the Colombian National Police believed that he was a leader of Los Papas at that time, we would have taken action.

01:10:44:03 The fact that your hindsight’s always 20/20, you know… And it still hasn’t been confirmed that this individual is one of the leaders. But, you know, what I’m trying to get across to ya is that this was such—there was so much violence going on, so much death…

01:10:57:25 There was one night that when I was in Medine and we’d come in off a day-long patrol and you’re tired and you’ve had dinner or what they call dinner, and you’re just kind of out in the fields around the base walking around getting a little exercise and trying to relax a little bit, 17 bombs…

01:11:11:12 We counted 17 bombs went off in the city of Medine that night. So, yes, we were willing to talk to whoever we could to collect information, especially if the Colombian National Police brought them to our attention. Okay? I hope that answers your question.
Q: What are those masks up there for?

JP: The what now?

Q: What are those masks...

JP: Oh! It was General (Unint.) who decided to give em to the DEA Museum. That’s supposed to be Pablo Escobar during his run, basically what he looked like. And that was another disguise he had. So they’re more of a... This was his life masks [sic].

Q: (Inaud.).

JP: Ma’am?

Q: Do they ever put them on?

JP: Oh, I don’t think so.

MS: They’re door prizes.

Q: How old was Pablo Escobar like dealing drugs, like, you know, how long (inaud.)?

JP: You know what? That’s a great question. Usually these people when they ran their organizations, they didn’t allow their workers to use drugs. They themselves do not use drugs, so that’ll tell you something, right? They don’t want their workers to be messed up, to be high. Why?

Cause, you know, they’re gonna—it’s bad for business. So most of those people at the higher level of your drug distributors, they’re not into drugs. But they—that’s what they want. They want us to use their products. Anybody else?

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER

FS: Again, thank you. Can we give em a big round of applause. [APPLAUSE] In closing I just want to pass this information on, that we have another lecture series coming up at the end of May and the topic will be the Ariano (ph.) Felix Organization. So look to see a lot of e-mails on that, and thank you all again. [APPLAUSE]